In a rent for the hill, “America is not prepared in a blow to our nuclear weapons,” argued the freelance journalist Ben Ollerenshaw that this was absolutely responsible for the nuklear threats with which the nation was exposed to because it takes a “single point of failure: the nuclear command, control and communication systems”.
He explains that the nation depends on highly vulnerable E-6B Mercury Command-and-Control aircraft, which, because they are now on “floor alarm”, instead of flying around the clock, make goings of goals for A. Surprise of nuclear, drone or rocket attack.
If such an attack occurs, Ollerenshaw argues that the president will no longer use the nuclear weapons of the nation. Fortunately, that’s just wrong. The nuclear commands, the control and communication system have far more ways to transmit the presidential regulations.
The system connects sensors and protects with decision -makers who A Recognize framework, decide and directly. The detection uses sensors that identify and correlate opponents to facilitate them. As soon as the discovery is determined and the evaluation is made, the Senior Leaders Conference checks plans and determines the decision -making process about the action courses for the campaign.
Finally, presidential decisions are transferred by The system Guaranteed to the Nuclear armed forces who are charged with weapon employment under any circumstances or surroundings. In order to take this bold mission into account, the system must be Survival, fast and flexible.
Note that the nuclear command, the control and communication system is essentially a system of systems that resemble a spider web. If one is broken, there are other strands with which a president can see that a message is transferred to strength in the field. Historically it was by that of A Duication times of peace “thick line” and a survival “thin line” daugy time of the war should destroy the USA attack on the USA
In peace times, the national military command center in the Pentagon and in the Global Operations Center of the US Strategic Command serves as the main command and control center for the country’s nuclear forces. These facilities are not designed in such a way that the directions are transmitted nuclear solids, but in the past seven decades they and their predesses have carried out the work in peace and crises.
The country initiated the Cold War (1961-1990), the country also included EC-135 Command-Control aircraft in continuous air operating operations. Fly around the clock seven days a week at the clock. The command of the air reflected the captalities of the global operation center. If this has been destroyed in an atomic attack, it is Airborne Emergency Action Officer Was able to take over and fulfill the commands of the commander for the strategic air command.
The looking glass aircraft was an insurance policy against a surprising Soviet nuclear strike. They improved the second -style skills, strengthened strategic stability and gave a psychological and political signal. The continuous presence of the looking Glass sent a clear signal for the dissolution, vigilance and willingness to react to the American determination and strengthening of the overseas strategic deterrent.
However, this does not mean that the national military command center, the Global Operations Center and the Look glass aircraft were the only options for command and control of the nuclear powers. In fact, both the National Military Command Center and the Global Operations Center turned at the beginning of a Soviet nuclear strike at the beginning of a Soviet nuclear strike, and that the command after the gap was quickly taken over.
However, there was always an observer that the aircraft is destroyed by Soviet aircraft or rockets or simply emanates from the fact that they recover the ability to fuel air tanking. So it should not be a surprise that the Air Force developed “backups to our backups” and spent the time to work all plausible scanarios in which the national military command center and the national military command center and the global surgical center were destroyed in an attack, so we were the KC-135S and now E-6B fleet.
In our own career, we took part in Wargames, Exeraces and working groups in which such events occurred. It is also important to understand that the US strategic command, the common staff and other elements of the national commanding agency regularly carry out exercises and imitate the castrophes of events. This means that the uniformed and civilian personnel, which the nuclear command, control and communication system operates, is regularly trained for operation under degraded conditions.
Out of 2022 Review of the nuclear attitudePublished by the bidet administration, confirmed a long schedule that “the US main administrators start the ability to start the nuclear dispute under the conditions of an outgoing nuclear attack, and not only supports itself to start the guidelines for the attack in order to receive a credible reaction.
For decades, the USA opted for Reduncy to meet its resilience requirements. Redundant systems, redundant command nodes and a redundant way of communications require consultant resources and personal exAIRCESE if America is a noble enthusiast to “ride” a first strike.
There is no deterrent with a credible threat from existing retaliation. This means that America’s nuclear command, control and communication systems always have to work on working on the first strike at home. America’s deterrence from the nuclear arsenal resources for the enforcement of posture and starting policy, America’s deterrence Can’t depend on the hope Survive; It must depend on the action. This is exactly how the system is developed.
Adam Lowter, Ph.D. He spent two decades as a public service in the Ministry of Defense Nuclear. Col. (Ret.) Curtis McGiffin is Vice President of Education at the National Institute for Damage Studies. During his career, he flew nuclear command and control aircraft.
